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INABILITY TO PAY: COURT DEBT CIRCA 2020* 
JUDITH RESNIK** & DAVID MARCUS*** 
Commitments to “access to justice” abound. So do economic barriers that 
undermine that premise. Fees, costs, fines, money bail, and other financial 
assessments—levied by courts, jails, and prisons—have become commonplace 
features of state and federal civil and criminal law enforcement.1 
Yet the challenges of funding courts and the harms of debt generated 
through interactions with the legal system have not yet become staples of law 
school teaching and scholarship. This mini-symposium is one of many efforts 
to bring to the fore the failures of law to make good on its promises of open 
courts and equal treatment of civil disputants and criminal defendants. The 
Essays that follow contribute to a growing literature mapping the impact of 
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 **  Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School; 2018–2019 Chair, Section on Civil 
Procedure of the American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”). 
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AALS. 
  This introduction and the Essays that follow grew out of a discussion at the AALS annual 
meeting in January of 2019. We have learned a great deal from the participants who are writing for the 
North Carolina Law Review (Brandon Buskey, Pamela Foohey, Gloria Gong, Paul Heaton, Cortney 
Lollar, and Jeffrey Selbin) and from the other presenters: Abbye Atkinson from Berkeley Law; Lisa 
Foster, Co-Director of the Fines and Fees Justice Center; Alec Karakatsanis, Founder and Executive 
Director of the Civil Rights Corps; and Maureen O’Connor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio and Co-Chair of the National Center for State Courts’ Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail 
Practices, all of whom joined us at the AALS Symposium, “Court Debt”: Fines, Fees, and Bail, Circa 
2020, co-sponsored by the Sections on Civil Procedure, Tax, Bankruptcy, and Criminal Justice. We 
also appreciate the help from Professor Carissa Byrne Hessick and the North Carolina Law Review for 
making this mini-symposium possible, and from Alexandra Eynon, Yale Law School Class of 2019, and 
Stephanie Garlock, Yale Law School Class of 2020, for thoughtful and expert assistance. Finally, a 
caveat is in order about the footnotes to follow in this introduction. The relevant law and the 
scholarship are far more extensive than the few illustrations we provide here. 
 1. In an effort to make accessible for teaching, advocacy, and research, the Liman Center at Yale 
Law School edited two volumes, available as e-books without charge, that include samplings of many 
court decisions, statutes, law school clinical work, scholarly essays, and in-depth reports on these issues. 
See generally JUDITH RESNIK, ANNA VANCLEAVE, KRISTEN BELL, SKYLAR ALBERTSON, NATALIA 
FRIEDLANDER, ILLYANA GREEN & MICHAEL MORSE, ARTHUR LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST 
LAW, YALE LAW SCH., WHO PAYS? FINES, FEES, BAIL, AND THE COST OF COURTS (2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/liman_colloquium_book_04.20.18
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VCA-VVWD]; JUDITH RESNIK, ANNA VANCLEAVE, ALEXANDRA 
HARRINGTON, JEFF SELBIN, LISA FOSTER, JOANNA WEISS, FAITH BARKSDALE, ALEXANDRA 
EYNON, STEPHANIE GARLOCK & DANIEL PHILLIPS, ARTHUR LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST 
LAW, YALE LAW SCH., ABILITY TO PAY (2019), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/
liman/document/liman_colloquium_book_combined_cover_march_21_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4646-N9QQ]. 
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court and prison debt. This mini-symposium, in turn, offers law teachers and 
students a window into the breadth of research, litigation, legislation, and legal 
analyses aiming to understand and to stop what have become regressive tax 
systems that are produced by virtue of court-based fees, fines, assessments, and 
money bail. 
Before detailing more about the Essays that follow, context is needed to 
show the links between the academy—focused on teaching about courts, 
procedure, bankruptcy, and criminal law enforcement—and the problems of 
courts and of the people using them. During the second half of the twentieth 
century, political and social movements brought into sharp relief inequalities 
and subordination based on race, class, gender, and many other status markers.2 
Activism and scholarship pushed courts and legislatures to recognize a host of 
rights and entitlements, ranging from protections of criminal defendants and 
prisoners to habitable housing, government benefits, and fair treatment in 
interactions with the state.3 
Courts and legislatures responded in some instances with new doctrines 
and statutes addressing individuals interacting with criminal law enforcement 
systems, people seeking housing, recipients of federal benefits, and individuals 
harmed by various kinds of discrimination. While the United States Supreme 
Court declined to recognize poverty as a suspect classification,4 it relied on an 
alchemy of due process and equal protection to recognize the need to provide 
resources for some low-income individuals when in conflict with the state.5 
As a result, legal mandates require that, in some cases, states provide 
lawyers to indigent criminal defendants and, on rare occasions, to civil litigants; 
further, under certain circumstances, courts have to waive fees and subsidize 
transcripts and experts.6 In addition, Congress created the Legal Services 
Corporation and authorized fee shifting to encourage the pursuit of civil rights 
 
 2. Many accounts illuminate these efforts. See, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: 
LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 1–3 (1993); KAREN M. TANI, 
STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972, at 9–11 
(2016). 
 3. One example is Charles Reich’s analysis in The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), which 
framed a sequence of efforts to establish rights to security and well-being and helped to generate 
entitlement theory that created some buffers through procedural safeguards to the termination of 
government licenses and benefits. See also Judith Resnik, The Story of Goldberg: Why This Case Is Our 
Shorthand, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 473, 503–06 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 4. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1973). 
 5. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–66 (1970). 
 6. Examples include M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106–07 (1996); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 
1, 16–17 (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1971); and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963). For additional support, see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and 
Litigation Access Fees: The Right To Protect One’s Rights (pt. 1), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1158–62; Judith 
Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in 
Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2132–37 (2000). 
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claims.7 Both legislatures and courts shaped class actions and other forms of 
aggregation to permit cost sharing among litigants and to provide incentives for 
lawyers to represent groups.8 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded 
that, rather than incarcerating people who lacked resources to pay fines, a 
hearing was required to inquire about their ability to pay.9 
During the last several decades, some of the efforts to facilitate access to 
courts have been cut back through changes in statutes and in judicial 
interpretation.10 State and federal prosecutorial efforts have expanded, and the 
country has had economic downturns. Many jurisdictions have tried to pass the 
costs associated with courts, policing, and detention on to individuals. Instead 
of responding through raising or reallocating general revenues or by altering 
policies, states and the federal government have produced a welter of fees and 
payback obligations. 
“Court debt” has become one shorthand for obligations incurred from 
many sources, including administrative fees, money bail, punitive fines, and 
victim restitution charges, as well as charges for transcripts, public defenders, 
detention on arrests, diversion programs, monitoring in lieu of bail, and 
incarceration.11 In some jurisdictions, judges have become partners with law 
enforcement in what could sadly be termed a joint “fundraising” endeavor that 
treats individuals charged with offenses and infractions as sources of revenue 
instead of as needing to be helped and heard by law.12 For example, localities 
 
 7. See, e.g., ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, 
SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 19–22 (2007), https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/public/resources-and-
publications/files/0158.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JRV-GC8U]; Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act 
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC 
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 110–14 (2010). 
 8. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 589–91 (2013); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and 
Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 660–62 (2011); Judith Resnik, From 
“Cases” to “Litigation”, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 7–11. 
 9. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397–99 
(1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970). 
 10. Examples include revised interpretations of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and of the Federal Arbitration Act, now read to permit employers and service providers to impose bans 
on collective action in courts or arbitration. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018); 
Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353–55 (2011); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and 
the Erosion of Substantive Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3052, 3059–62 (2015); Symposium, 1966 and All That: 
Class Actions & Their Alternatives After Fifty Years, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017); Judith Resnik, 
Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner 
v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1406 (2018). 
 12. The U.S. Department of Justice’s report on Ferguson, Missouri, and the subsequent litigation 
and settlement provide one of many examples. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–12 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON 
REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z52X-KFTW]. Courts have also 
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have assessed “registration fees” for a “free” public defender.13 Some 
jurisdictions seek recoupment of the costs of both lawyers and trials after an 
individual is convicted.14 And, as the United States Supreme Court detailed in 
Nelson v. Colorado,15 not all jurisdictions return the assessments when 
individuals are acquitted.16 
One focus of the burgeoning literature is on the costs imposed through 
criminal law enforcement. Another is on civil litigants facing a barrage of special 
fees, surcharges, and assessments.17 For example, in the federal courts, the 
decision to waive filing fees is not based on a uniform standard calibrated to 
national guidelines on income but on the local practices of the district in which 
litigants allege they cannot afford to pay fees.18 And, in some states, defendants 
obliged to reply to a lawsuit are also charged to file in court.19 Another category 
of cases relates to immigrants. Detention in the “civil” immigration system 
reflects individuals’ resources. Immigrants held in detention during the 
pendency of their asylum or removal proceedings may not be able to afford 
bonds, if they are set at all.20 
An aggregate picture of the different sources of “legal financial 
obligations” (“LFOs”) comes from an impressive array of empirical evidence 
that attends to the racial inequalities and that has documented how fees 
assessed, bail imposed, and debt associated with the legal system put 
individuals, families, and communities into cycles of poverty and punishment.21 
In some jurisdictions, driver’s licenses can be suspended because of unpaid court 
 
recognized incentives to impose charges. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019); see also 
United States v. Basurto, 117 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1287 n.6 (D.N.M. 2015) (discussing the incentives that 
arise when court budgets depend on the fees that they can assess defendants). 
 13. E.g., State v. Brawley, 195 A.3d 113, 117–18 (N.H. 2018). 
 14. People v. Cameron, 900 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017). 
 15. 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017). 
 16. Id. at 1252–54. 
 17. STATUTORY COURT FEE TASK FORCE, ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS: FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND ADDITIONAL 
ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH FEES AND OTHER COURT COSTS IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL, AND TRAFFIC 
PROCEEDINGS (2016) [hereinafter ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016], 
http://www.ilga.gov/reports/special/Statutory%20Court%20Fee%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RZ8T-AYR3].  
 18. Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478, 1497–99 (2019). 
 19. ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 17, at 10; SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., 
STATEWIDE CIVIL FEE SCHEDULE (2014), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/filingfees.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SLJ4-L6CM]. 
 20. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2017). The decision enjoined the 
practice in the Central District of California of setting bonds for detained immigrants without an 
inquiry into ability to pay. Id. 
 21. See ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR 
THE POOR 5–8, 11–12 (2016). 
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debt;22 in others, voting rights can be cut off. The impact of such practices is 
felt most acutely by people with limited resources and by communities of color, 
either because they seek assistance from the legal system or because they are 
subjected to over-policing, prosecution, and punishment.23 Moreover, rather 
than serving to improve public safety, court-imposed financial obligations result 
in locking people out of participating in programs aimed at rehabilitation. As a 
result, interactions with courts can lead to more social dislocation and crime.24 
Vivid examples of the injuries have been encapsulated in the sad shorthand 
of “Ferguson,” which made national headlines in 2015.25 Ferguson was not sui 
generis. Activists, researchers, members of the media, a host of local, state, and 
national bar associations, judicial task forces, translocal organizations of 
government actors, and litigators have now detailed how LFOs undermine fair 
and just decisionmaking.26 In response, commitments to change egregious 
 
 22. E.g., Robinson v. Purkey, Civ. No. 17-cv-1263, 2018 WL 5023330, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 
16, 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-6121 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2018). 
 23. See Monica C. Bell, Hidden Laws of the Time of Ferguson, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 8–15 (2018); 
Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Age of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283, 2317–19 (2018). 
 24. See, e.g., Briggs v. Montgomery, No. CV-18-02684-PHX-EJM, 2019 WL 2515950, at *10 (D. 
Ariz. June 18, 2019). 
 25. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 12, at 1–2; see also Consent Decree at 1–2, United States 
v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016).  
 26. See, e.g., Mitali Nagrecha & Ranit Patel, The Need for Proportionality in Criminal Justice Debt 
Practices, in THE LIMAN CENTER REPORTS: 2018, https://law.yale.edu/system/files/
area/center/liman/document/2018_liman_report-5_final_combined_version.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2ZA-94H8]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A POUND OF FLESH: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF PRIVATE DEBT (2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/022318-debtreport_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4R3-57M7]; Lauren Sudeall & Ruth 
Richardson, Unfamiliar Justice: Indigent Criminal Defendants’ Experiences with Civil Legal Needs, 52 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 2105 (2019); ALABAMA APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, UNIV. OF ALA. AT 
BIRMINGHAM TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR SAFER CMTYS. (TASC), GREATER BIRMINGHAM 
MINISTRIES & LEGAL SERVS. ALA., UNDER PRESSURE: HOW FINES AND FEES HURT PEOPLE, 
UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY, AND DRIVE ALABAMA’S RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE (2018), 
http://www.alabamaappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/AA1240-FinesandFees-10-10-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYT2-R88H]; FINANCIAL JUSTICE PROJECT, CRIMINAL, OFFICE OF 
THE TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR, CITY & CTY. OF S.F., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE 
FEES: HIGH PAIN FOR PEOPLE, LOW GAIN FOR GOVERNMENT (2018), 
https://sftreasurer.org/sites/default/files/Hig%20Pain%20Low%20Gain%20FINAL_04-24-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MAL3-AG99]; FINES & FEES JUSTICE CTR., Our Vision, Work, Campaigns, and 
Clearinghouse, in ABILITY TO PAY (2019); Data Portal, MEASURES FOR JUSTICE, 
https://measuresforjustice.org/ [https://perma.cc/8MG9-7VH8]; THERESA ZHEN & BRANDON 
GREENE, E. BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., PAY OR PREY: HOW THE ALAMEDA COUNTY CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM EXTRACTS WEALTH FROM MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES (2018), 
https://ebclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/EBCLC_CrimeJustice_WP_Fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G75K-3UYW]; N.Y. CITY BAR, NEW YORK SHOULD RE-EXAMINE MANDATORY COURT FEES 
IMPOSED ON INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND VIOLATIONS (2019), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2018410-MandatorySurchargesCriminal
Charges.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BHV-FZ8K]; Driven by Debt: How Driver’s License Suspensions for 
Unpaid Fines And Fees Hurt Texas Families, TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT & TEX. APPLESEED (2018), 
http://stories.texasappleseed.org/driven-by-debt [https://perma.cc/8VLQ-AF5B]; JAMES CRAVEN & 
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practices have grown.27 New legislation and administrative actions have resulted 
in significant proposals for and, in some instances, enacted reforms that include 
limiting or ending the assessment of fees and abolishing money bail.28 
The research and legislation have also helped to produce new case law. In 
2019, the United States Supreme Court concluded in a case in which a person 
convicted under state law faced the forfeiture of his car that the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to the states.29 An amalgam of due 
process and equal protection analyses have prompted lower courts to hold 
unconstitutional the automatic suspension of driver’s licenses,30 the imposition 
of money bail for those unable to pay,31 the fees levied by judges who benefit 
 
SAL NUZZO, JAMES MADISON INST., CHANGING COURSE: DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION IN 
FLORIDA (2018), https://www.jamesmadison.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Backgrounder_
DriverLicense_9.12.18_v02-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RKA-9CRZ]. 
 27. See, e.g., ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON BLDG. PUB. TR. IN THE AM. JUSTICE SYS., 
TEN GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES AND FEES (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_ind_10_guidelines_court_fines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VLH-SPE3]; NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PRINCIPLES ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES (2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Fines%20and%20Fees/Principles-Fines-Fees.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/RWB4-XHKD]. 
 28. See, e.g., Press Release, Supreme Court of Illinois, Supreme Court Announces Changes to 
Make Court Costs More Manageable (Feb. 13, 2019), https://courts.illinois.gov/Media/
PressRel/2019/021319.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8TC-SDLE]; Application for Waiver of Court Fees & 
Application for Waiver of Court Assessments, ILL. SUP. CT. AMENDED R. 298, R. 404 (2019); Order, 
In re: Civil Assessment Schedules, M.R. 29741 (Ill. Feb. 13, 2019), https://courts.illinois.gov/
SupremeCourt/Announce/2019/021319_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXV8-T958]; CITY & COUNTY OF 
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE NO. 131-18 amending the Administrative Code to abolish fees 
associated with probation costs, restitution, booking, the Sheriff’s Work Alternative Program, the 
automated county warrant system, the Sheriff’s Home Detention Program, and to abolish local 
penalties associated with alcohol testing and court-ordered penalties for misdemeanor and felony 
offenses (passed June 5, 2018, effective July 1, 2018); 
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE NO. 2018-67 amending the Administrative Code to eliminate 
probation fees; repealing resolution regarding public defender/conflict counsel fees for representation 
of indigent adults; and eliminating Sheriff’s Work Alternative Program administrative and attendance 
fees (Dec. 4, 2018). 
 29. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019); Beth Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: 
Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 10–13 (2018); Judith Resnik, 
(Un)Constitutional Punishments: Eighth Amendment Silos, Penological Purposes, and People’s “Ruin”, 129 
YALE L.J. F. 365, 367–69 (2020).  
 30. See, e.g., Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 494 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), vacated as moot 
sub nom. Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. App’x 910, 911 (6th Cir. 2019) (mem.); Robinson v. Purkey, Civ. No. 
17-cv-1263, 2018 WL 5786236, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 16, 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-6121 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 24, 2018). 
 31. See e.g., In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 525–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), discretionary 
review granted 417 P.3d 769 (Cal. 2018); ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1155 (S.D. 
Tex. 2017), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); Schultz v. Alabama, 330 F. Supp. 
3d 1344, 1366 (N.D. Ala. 2018), appeal filed; Buffin v. City & Cty. of S.F., 2019 WL 1017537, at *16 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) (unpublished table decision); People v. Dueñas, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 276–
77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019). But see Walker v. Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019). 
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from their assessment,32 and the setting of bond amounts for immigrants 
without an inquiry into ability to pay. 
That backdrop makes plain the contributions of the Essays that follow. 
Money bail is the focus of discussions by Paul Heaton, Brandon Buskey, and 
Gloria Gong. Heaton’s research on the “downstream” consequences of being 
held in jail rather than released before trial has been central to litigation 
challenging money bail systems.33 In his Essay, Heaton surveys how empirical 
studies have documented that pretrial detention puts a person at greater risks 
of conviction, loss of job, loss of child custody, and future prosecution.34 
Further, as Buskey explains, “affordable bail” is often an oxymoron, as the 
amounts imposed do not reflect individuals’ ability to pay.35 Moreover, Buskey 
underscores how “risk assessment tools” are used to justify detention of 
individuals who, even on those metrics, are very unlikely to miss court dates or 
commit a violent offense.  
Gong, based at the Kennedy School at Harvard University, details how 
the Government Performance Lab (“GPL”) provides advice to localities about 
how to implement bail reforms effectively.36 Over-supervision and the lack of 
provision of services can undercut individuals’ capacity to succeed once 
released. The GPL aims to advise governments on how to invest wisely in new 
programs that are sustainable. 
Jeffrey Selbin documents the assessments imposed by counties in 
California on parents of children held in detention.37 His Policy Advocacy 
Clinic, based at UC Berkeley, exposed the perverse outcomes that the millions 
of dollars in these assessments have had, in terms of recidivism for young 
offenders and family disunity. Families of color have borne a disproportionate 
amount of the suffering. As Selbin’s Essay describes, the clinic convinced the 
 
 32. See, e.g., Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 317 (E.D. La. 2018), aff’d, 937 F.3d 525 
(5th Cir. 2019); Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 649 (E.D. La. 2017); Cain v. City 
of New Orleans, 327 F.R.D. 111, 121 (E.D. La. 2018), appeal filed. 
 33. See, e.g., ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1106. In July 2019, the Harris County Commissioners 
Court approved a settlement—to be reviewed by the district court—that institutes a new bail protocol, 
provides for a monitor of the new system, implements public defender services, and ultimately calls for 
eighty-five percent of all misdemeanor defendants to be released on personal bonds. Gabrielle Banks, 
Harris County Approves Historic Bail Deal, Ends ‘Irreparable Harm’, HOUS. CHRON. (July 30, 2019, 8:19 
PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-
approves-historic-bail-deal-ends-14253660.php [https://perma.cc/B4W6-NKGV]. 
 34. Paul Heaton, The Expansive Reach of Pretrial Detention, 98 N.C. L. REV. 369 (2020). 
 35. Brandon Buskey, Wrestling with Risk: The Questions Beyond Money Bail, 98 N.C. L. REV. 379 
(2020). 
 36. Gloria Gong, The Next Step: Building, Funding, and Measuring Pretrial Services (Post-Bail 
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state to preclude counties from imposing such charges. The clinic has also 
succeeded in having some counties waive the debt owed. 
An Essay by Pamela Foohey highlights the intersection between court 
debt and the bankruptcy system.38 Foohey describes the limited pathways that 
individuals can pursue in order to discharge court debt in bankruptcy. Drawing 
upon large empirical studies, she explains how disparities in access to 
meaningful discharge can entrench racially disparate aspects of the court-debt 
problem.  
Cortney Lollar’s contribution shows how debt subordinates and 
marginalizes low-wage earners, who are disproportionately members of 
communities of color.39 Further, she traces the evolution of debtors’ prisons and 
explains how, as debt obligations have mounted, constitutional protections 
against imprisonment for nonpayment have waned. 
Many of us who teach about courts provide an idealized version of what 
the constitutional and procedural rules require. Given the impact that courts 
can have in shaping people’s lives, the purpose of bringing together law 
professors from different fields at the American Association of Law Schools’ 
annual meeting and of this set of Essays is to bring into our classes and resources 
the structure of courts and the experiences of the users of courts. Whether by 
reading case law, exercises such as drafting in forma pauperis applications, or 
through articles such as those in this mini-symposium, teachers of law can help 
students and the public understand both the impressive research and reforms of 
the last few years and the need for more. Given the pervasive use of fees and 
fines to fund court processes, the questions that ought to preoccupy us all are 
whether and how constitutional democracies can meet their obligations to make 
justice accessible.40 Our hope is that, through symposia such as this one, the 
costs imposed by courts will become part of mainstream discussions in law 
schools.41 The invitation to readers is to use this commentary as an entry point 
into thinking, teaching, and writing about how to make the legal system live up 
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